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ABSTRACT
We construct measures of the extent to which the 4 main newspapers in Argentina report government
corruption in their front page during the period 1998-2007 and correlate them with the extent to which
each newspaper is a recipient of government advertising. The correlation is negative. The size is considerable:
a one standard deviation increase in monthly government advertising (0.26 million pesos of 2000)
is associated with a reduction in the coverage of the government’s corruption scandals by 0.31 of a
front page per month, or 25% of a standard deviation in our measure of coverage. The results are robust
to the inclusion of newspaper, month, newspaper*president and individual-corruption scandal fixed














The media plays an important role in modern democracies. For example, it provides 
a large proportion of the information with which policymakers and voters make 
decisions, as well as analysis and editorial content that may influence the conclusions 
reached by potential voters (see, for example, Lippmann, 1922).
1 Understandably, the 
possibility that there is bias in the media has worried economists, as well as many 
social and political commentators on both sides of the political spectrum (see, for 
example, Goldberg, 2001, Alterman, 2003). A recent literature has developed 
different measures of media bias and analyzed how they might behave in equilibrium. 
Beyond the possibility of ideological influences on the media, some have worried 
that financial motivations of media companies might lead them to bias their content 
in exchange for advertisement or other type of transfers (see, for example, Hamilton, 
2003 , Reuter and Zeitzewitz, 2006). Given that in many settings the government is 
the largest advertiser in the media, this is particularly troublesome as there is 
evidence that the introduction of investigative reporters and mass media, at least in 
some cases, was associated with increased government accountability and lower 
corruption.
2  
In this paper we focus on a particular aspect of the media, namely the relationship 
between front page coverage and monetary transfers. Specifically, we study daily 
newspaper coverage of corruption scandals involving the government across the 4 
main newspapers in Argentina during the period 1998-2007. We also obtain the 
amount spent by the government on advertisement in each newspaper, each month. 
We find that there is a negative correlation between the amount of front page space 
devoted to coverage of corruption scandals and the amount of advertisement money 
paid to the newspaper each month. The size seems large: a one standard deviation 
increase in government advertisement is associated with a reduction in coverage of 
corruption scandals by 0.31 of a cover per month, or 25% of a standard deviation in 
our measure of front page coverage. Our results are robust to the inclusion of 
newspaper and month fixed effects and of government-newspaper interactions, 
suggesting that within a particular newspaper, and during a particular government, 
adverse coverage is negatively correlated with government advertising. This solves 
the central identification problem in the literature, whereby media (newspapers) that 
are close to the advertiser (government) give favorable coverage and friendly 
advertisers (governments) give more funds to media (newspapers) that are 
                                                           
1 Work on the effects of news contents includes Besley and Burgess (2002), Stromberg (2004), Gentzkow and 
Shapiro (2004), Gentzkow (2006), della Vigna and Kaplan (2007), Dyck, Volchkova and Zingales (2008), 
Gerber, Karlan and Bergan (2008), inter alia. 
2 For example, Gentzkow, Glaeser and Goldin (2006) show how the American newspaper industry became 
more informative thanks to an increase in scale at a time corruption declined and argue that the rise of the 
informative press was one of the reasons why the corruption of the Gilded Age was sharply reduced during the 
subsequent Progressive Era. 3 
 
ideologically close and none of it is motivated by material concerns. Similar results 
obtain when using alternative measures of coverage that allow us to control for news 
event dummies (i.e., scandal fixed effects). Given that we have data on individual 
news events, we are able to study coverage of scandals using alternative measures, 
such as the number of scandals the newspaper has not yet reported but that others 
already have (Hide), front page coverage of corruption scandals that were reported by 
just one newspaper (which we call Front Pages Incidents) and coverage regarding 
scandals that were widely reported (by at least two newspapers, which we call Front 
Pages Affaires). We also find that the correlation between government transfers and 
the reporting of corruption disappears when we focus on the advertising that is not 
channeled through a government centralized agency or when we study the coverage 
of scandals by non-political actors. 
Our definition of bias is related to the measures derived in the recent literature on 
the topic. Two of the most influential are Groseclose and Milyo (2005), who focus 
on the possibility that some media outlets quote as source the same think tanks as 
partisan politicians and find that the vast majority of outlets is biased to the left; and 
Gentzkow and Shapiro (2006) who focus on the possibility that some media outlets 
use the same expressions and language as partisan politicians and find that 
newspaper slant is influenced by its reader’s ideological inclination.
3 Whereas these 
measures are (broadly) absolute, it is possible to calculate a rough measure of bias by 
examining the relative intensity with which they cover a specific issue. In our case, 
we calculate an average reporting of corruption (that may be calculated for a certain 
newspaper; or for a certain moment; or for a certain newspaper during a particular 
period of time), and observe if newspaper reporting is different than this average 
when government advertising is relatively high. Thus, if all papers are biased, we do 
not detect it with our tests.  
Previous work has focused on the correlates of related measures of media bias. For 
example, Larcinese, Puglisi and Snyder (2007) study how newspapers who tend to 
endorse Democratic candidates systematically give more coverage to high 
unemployment when the incumbent president is a Republican than when the 
president is Democratic, compared to newspapers with a pro-Republican 
endorsement pattern. In other words, identification comes from comparing 
reporting on a common event across different newspapers, a similar empirical 
strategy to the one we follow. Two papers that are particularly close to our study 
given their focus on the effect of advertising on coverage, are Reuter and Zitzewitz 
(2006) and Gambaro and Puglisi (2009). Both papers study the extent to which the 
media biases its content to benefit private sector advertisers, a common claim in the 
                                                           
3 See Ansolabehere, Lessem and Snyder (2006) for work on bias using explicit endorsements of newspapers in 
the US and Baum and Gussin (2007) for work on the subjective component of bias. For theoretical work on 
media bias see Mullainathan and Shleifer (2005), Baron (2006) and Besley and Prat (2006). 4 
 
popular press for which there was no systematic evidence (see, for example, Baker, 
1994 and Hamilton, 2004). Reuter and Zitzewitz (2006) find that mutual fund 
recommendations are correlated with past advertising in three personal finance 
publications but not in two national newspapers, even after controlling for several 
fund characteristics, total advertising expenditures, and past mentions. They note 
that future returns are similar for mutual funds that are predicted to have been 
mentioned in the absence of bias, and conclude that in this case the cost of 
advertising bias to readers is small. Gambaro and Puglisi (2009) match newspaper 
coverage of a sample of companies in Italy with the amount of advertising each 
company has acquired. They find that the number of articles mentioning that 
company is positively associated with the amount of advertising, especially when 
interacted with data on the press releases issued by the companies. Finally, Puglisi 
and Snyder (2008) use automatic keyword-based searches to study the relative 
frequency with which close to 200 newspapers cover a set of 35 scandals in the US. 
They find that newspapers endorsing Democratic (Republican) candidates tend to 
give relatively more coverage to scandals involving Republican (Democratic) 
politicians.
4  
Some authors have stressed the possibility of reduced government accountability 
when the governments influence the media. Djankov, et al (2003) document 
widespread government ownership of the media around the world, and a positive 
correlation between public ownership of the media and several measures of poor 
government performance (see also, Brunetti and Weder, 2003). An important paper 
for us is Besley and Prat (2006) as they present a model where the government can 
pay a media outlet to suppress a story. In equilibrium, capture is less prevalent when 
there are a large number of media firms and high transaction costs. In their model 
they assume that only verifiable information gets to be printed and that once one 
firm prints it, there is no point in preventing others from following suit, so there are 
no equilibria in which the government bribes some outlets but not others.
5 We note 
that with non-verifiable pieces of news this is not always the case, both because 
rational consumers of the media become more certain about the truth of an event 
widely reported and because some “impressionable” consumers may think a piece of 
news is more likely to be true when it is repeated (i.e., even when it is clear that it is 
the same report; on message repetition see, for example, Petty and Cacciopo, 1981). 
                                                           
4 Gentzkow, Glaeser and Goldin (2006) study how the coverage of scandals changed over time in the US.  
5 This is plausible and there is evidence that legal decisions in the US take precisely this view See, for example, 
the evidence discussed in Gentzkow and Shapiro (2005) about the futility of government injunctions against 
publication of items already revealed by one newspaper during the deliberations prior to the Supreme Court’s 
decision on New York Times Co. v. United States (403 U.S. 713 [1971]). But the alternative assumption of readers 
consuming only one publication is also attractive in some settings (see for example the discussion in 
Mullainathan and Shleifer, 2005). 5 
 
Several authors have studied the role of the media during periods of political change. 
For example, Gehlbach and Sonin (2008) discuss the media in postcommunist Russia 
and its response to the needs of the Kremlin and the growth in the size of the 
advertising market. Such country studies reveal that governments use a variety of 
ways to influence the media, from the passing of favorable laws to media firms (or 
affiliated companies), to threats of legal action against journalists, to business favors, 
amongst others. McMillan and Zoido (2004), for example, document the use of 
several of these instruments in the case of Peru when Vladimiro Montesinos was the 
head of intelligence agency. Note that politicians’ with long standing business 
connections with the media have lower transaction costs in their interactions with 
the media. The case of Berlusconi in Italy is a case in point (see, for example, 
Durante and Knight, 2009). Finally, we do not review work in communications, 
although there have been several authors who have also emphasized the possibility 
of bias arising from a desire to keep access to sources of information even in 
developed countries (see, for an example, Bennet 1990). 
In Section II we provide some background information on government interference 
in the media in Argentina and anecdotal evidence on the role of government 
transfers in the form of advertising. We also discuss our data and how it was 
constructed, as well as our empirical strategy. Section III presents our main results 
while section IV offers a brief discussion. Section V concludes. 
 
I.  Background, Data and Empirical Strategy 
 
II.a. Background and Institutional Setting 
Governments in Latin America have used several different strategies to influence 
media content, and previous work has emphasized how these influences might 
generate biased coverage (see, for example, Alisky, 1981, Boas, 2005, Canizalez, 
2009, inter alia). Previous work by NGO’s on the subject in Latin America and, in 
particular, Argentina documents many direct violations of media freedom, including 
legal harassment and personal attacks against journalists (see, for example, Browne 
and Fitzpatrick, 2004 and ADC/Justice Initiative, 2008).
6 The ADC/Justice Initiative 
report also documents indirect forms of interference such as access to privileged 
information and, in particular, financial pressure through withdrawal of public 
                                                           
6 In a recent case an unprecedented number of tax inspectors (over 200) were sent to investigate tax and 
accounting violations at Clarín the day after Clarín reported on a corruption scandal at the tax authority. See 
Clarín, September 11, 2009, as well as all the 3 other newspapers in our sample. 6 
 
advertisement by the government. The case of Argentina is no exception. The report 
summarizes the situation in Argentina in 2003-08, as follows:  
“The national government regularly abuses its advertising powers, including 
through excessive allocations to political favorites and denial of advertising in 
retaliation for critical coverage. Such abuses are even more marked at the local 
level, where media are, as a rule, more dependent on provincial and municipal 
advertising.”  
An earlier report focused exclusively on Argentina, investigated the conditions at the 
national level and in four Argentine provinces between April 2003 and August 2004 
(ADC/Justice Initiative, 2005). It concludes: 
 “We found an entrenched culture of pervasive abuse by provincial government 
officials who manipulate distribution of advertising for political and personal 
purposes … The effects of such abuses are especially insidious when public 
sector advertising is critical to the financial survival of media outlets, as is 
common in many Argentine provinces such as Tierra del Fuego, where on 
average, print and other media outlets receive approximately 75 percent of their 
advertising income from government agencies. Provincial governments, in 
particular, routinely use their control of advertising resources as financial sticks 
or carrots, whether it is to bankrupt an annoying publication or to 
inappropriately influence content.” 
The report documents several instances of full interruption of provincial government 
advertisement in critical newspapers (and, in one case, the simultaneous tripling of 
advertisement spending in a competitive newspaper). The federal government, unlike 
provincial governments, is legally required to use competitive bidding at some stage 
of the process, although this is rarely enforced.
7 Legal actions have been pursued and 
in September 2007, Argentina’s Supreme Court ruled that the provincial government 
of the Neuquén province violated the free speech rights of the Río Negro newspaper 
by withdrawing advertising in retaliation for critical coverage, while the province of 
Tierra del Fuego issued a decree reducing the discretion in the allocation of 
advertising contracts. 
While we focus on government advertising, financial pressure can be exerted through 
several different channels. A newspaper’s financial position can be affected by 
government rules and regulations and their enforcement, for example concerning 
their distribution. The position of the owners can also be affected, either directly 
(particularly when they are indebted) or indirectly (particularly when they have other 
                                                           
7 “The actual contracting of advertising for most agencies is done by the government’s news agency, Télam, 
which uses no competitive process whatsoever”. ADC/Justice Initiative (2005) 7 
 
large business interests). Examples of this strategy are observed in Argentina during 
our sample period. For example, an article in the The Economist (2006) contrasts 
national and provincial media and reports:  
“The national media are less dependent on public advertising, but have received 
other favours. The government has been particularly kind to the Clarín Group, 
Argentina's largest media conglomerate. After the devaluation of the peso in 
2002, the group -like many other Argentine companies- defaulted on its dollar 
debts. When its creditors threatened to take it over, Congress passed a law 
capping any foreigners' stake in "cultural goods" at 30%. The government has 
also extended for ten years the group's cable-television licenses. Perhaps not 
surprisingly, Clarín, Argentina's biggest-selling daily has tended to back the 
government.” 
Finally, it is unclear how independent from the public sector is private advertising in 
Argentina. A large part of what is typically included under private sector advertising 
is undertaken by firms with close ties to the government. In many cases this is direct, 
as is the case with state owned firms. Although in principle this could be measured, 
such an approach is complicated by the fact that the government has minority 
positions in several large companies (such as the company owning the main airport 
concession). In other cases, companies are privately owned (fully), yet their business 
is heavily affected by government decisions on tariffs (such as public utilities), or on 
regulations (such as banks, pension administrators and other financial institutions). 
In Argentina in 2005, the Secretary of Media (one Enrique Albistur) explained that a 
magazine that was particularly critical of the Kirchner government (Noticias) was to 
receive no government advertising as a result of a “political decision” (see 
ADC/Justice Initiative, 2008). After they sued the government for discrimination, 
the editor noted that private ads fell to half of their original volume, while the 
circulation of its publication grew steadily. Indeed, one of the characteristics of small 




We develop several measures of the intensity of coverage of government corruption 
scandals by newspapers. The simplest measure is Front Pages, the total space in the 
front page of a newspaper devoted to reporting on corruption scandals involving the 
federal government.
9 Specifically, we focused on the four main newspapers in 
                                                           
8 See Gentzkow, Glaeser and Goldin (2006) and Petrova (2008) for the role of private advertising in the 
development of an independent media in the US. 
9 This approach is both simple and has been used previously (at least broadly; see, for example, Chomsky and 
Herman, 1988 and Yu, 2008). 8 
 
Argentina (Clarín, La Nación, Página 12 and Ámbito Financiero), which represent 74% 
of the total circulation of national newspapers in Argentina and are the core of the 
non-yellow press sector. Two of them have lower circulation and are clearly at 
opposite ends of the political spectrum: Página 12 on the left, with relatively large 
coverage of themes related to human rights violations, particularly under the military 
dictatorship, and Ámbito Financiero on the right end of the spectrum, with ample 
coverage of financial news. The other two newspapers have wider circulation 
(approximately 10 times more on average on a given day), and are at the political 
center, with Clarín, somewhat to the left of La Nación, but we note that radio and TV 
shows reproduce (in some form) the content of these newspapers, so the true 
influence of these newspapers is not proportional to their circulation.
10 For each day 
in our sample period, and for each newspaper, a research assistant measured (using a 
computer) the area covered by any front page article that dealt with any corruption 
scandal that involved members of the current administration (e.g., the president or 
the ministers) and then divided it by the total area of the front page. This daily 
measure, which oscillates between 0 and 1, can then be aggregated up to a monthly 
measure to create Front Pages (which oscillates between 0 and 30). Figure 1 shows the 
front page of one day and illustrates how Front Pages is constructed. Table A 
describes the top 20 scandals in our sample in terms of front pages occupied in the 
four newspapers on the day the story broke, the month it broke and in the full 
sample. The number one scandal in our sample is the accusation that government 
officials bribed a group of senators in exchange for their legislative support in the 
year 2000. On the day it broke, it occupied 2.9 front pages out of a possible 4. On 
the month it broke, it occupied the equivalent of 17 front pages, with the equivalent 
of 43.9 front pages during the corresponding presidency (De la Rua’s). Note that 
these numbers comfortably exceed those of other scandals.  While this empirical 
measure is not automated, it is still reasonably reliable in that it involves front pages 
and measuring of space with a computer rather than content analysis (see Puglisi and 
Snyder, 2008, for a discussion). 
We also developed measures of corruption coverage that exploited information on 
individual scandals. There are 254 different scandals in our data base that appear in 
994 front pages.  The raw data on individual scandals (presented in Figure 2A) 
reveals that over 150 of them were reported in only one newspaper. It is possible to 
construct a simple measure of the speed with which newspapers break negative news 
for the government. Hide is the total number of corruption scandals of the current 
administration already reported by at least one newspaper that have not yet been 
reported by each newspaper per month.  
                                                           
10 In several early morning and late night TV shows it is common that the main headlines (front page) of these 
newspapers are read, with equal time given to each. In some of them these are discussed in some detail.   9 
 
We can also exploit the data on individual scandals using a measure similar to Front 
Pages, but considering only the space of the front page devoted to an individual 
corruption scandal (Figure 1 also illustrates how Front Pages Scandal is constructed). 
Thus, Front Pages Scandal is the total amount of space in the front pages of the month 
devoted to covering a particular corruption scandal of the current administration. 
Several corruption scandals are covered each month and the intensity with which 
each of these is covered varies across newspapers. 
Our measure of influence by the government is Government Advertising, the total 
spending per month on advertising in each newspaper by the government, in 
millions of pesos of the year 2000. Government spending on the four main 
newspapers (which are the ones covered in this paper) for 2003-4 was of a similar 
magnitude to spending on television stations (and approximately 10 times more than 
on radio) (see page 116 in ADC/Justice Initiative, 2005). Table B includes 
information regarding the 20 most expensive advertising campaigns over the 2000-
2007 period. We observe that government advertisement covers a wide range of 
activities which include requests for bids on government contracts, public 
announcements, the promotion of government accomplishments and even political 
statements. In addition, Figure 2B reveals that it is extremely rare for the government 
to publish a specific advertisement in all four newspapers. In fact, this happened for 
less than 500 out of the 5,313 advertising campaigns in the 2000-2007 period. 
Most contracting by the government in the advertising area is handled by Télam, the 
national government’s news agency, which reports directly to the president’s office. 
Government agencies make a request to Télam, which then decides where to place 
the ads. The legal framework for the placement of ads by Télam (basically a collection 
of government decrees) is “complex and ambiguous”, allowing complete discretion 
by government officials who are able to regularly avoid the use of competitive 
bidding, often using explicitly the argument of urgency (ADC/Justice Initiative, 
2005). The few agencies that handle their advertising autonomously are the National 
Tourism Office, the National Lottery, the Federal Administration for Public Income and the 
National Bank.
11 In Table C we explore the advertising allocation for both types of 
national agencies. The discrepancies are significant for Ámbito and La Nación during 
the Duhalde presidency and for Clarín, La Nación and Página 12 during the Kirchner 
presidency.
12 We will study this issue in more detail further in the paper. 
The data we use on government spending on advertising was obtained from 
Fundación Poder Ciudadano, an Argentine NGO who, in turn, obtained it from the 
government’s Secretaría de Medios de Comunicación de la Nación after a formal application 
                                                           
11 The exempted national agencies are able to contract their own advertising (including production and space), 
independently of Télam, and to define their own advertising processes. (ADC/Justice Initiative, 2005) 
12  We do not have information at the advertising campaign level for the Menem presidency. 10 
 
process. This NGO is quite influential in Argentina, and its involvement makes it 
more likely that the data is high quality.
13 The series starts in January 2000, but given 
that we have data on coverage from April 1998, we constructed a measure of 
government advertising ourselves in order to extend our data on government 
advertising back two years (until April 1998). We did this in two steps. First, we 
randomly took two days each month and manually measured (with a digital camera) 
for each of the four newspapers, the total space taken up by government advertising 
(in the full edition). We constructed the measure for three overlapping months 
(January, February and March 2000) so as to be able to convert space (in 
centimeters) to a peso measure of government advertising. 
Figure 3 presents the raw data on total corruption coverage per month (Front Pages) 
and total spending on advertising by the government per month (Government 
Advertising). Vertical red lines separate the four presidencies: Carlos Menem until 
December 1999, followed by Fernando De La Rua until early January 2002, followed 
by Eduardo Duhalde until May 25
th, 2003, followed by Nestor Kirchner until 
December 2007. It can be observed that newspapers report relatively more 
corruption scandals in the early and later part of the sample period, with the lowest 
amount of scandals reported during the middle of the sample (the Duhalde 
presidency).  It is also apparent that government advertising goes up over time. The 
most likely explanation is the stronger fiscal position of the government following 
the 2001 crisis. These changes in government advertising where also broadly in 
proportion to the ideological proximity of the government and the newspaper 
(calculated using data on the ideology of the government voters and the newspaper's 
readers). The Economist magazine summarizes the general view:   
“One of the government's tools is money. The robust recovery in Argentina's 
economy since its collapse of 2001-02 has boosted tax revenues. That has 
brought an eightfold increase in the real value of the federal publicity budget (to 
$46m in 2006) since Mr Kirchner took office in 2003. Argentine governments 
have a long tradition of funneling official advertising to sympathetic media and 
withholding it from others.” (The Economist, 2006) 
Figure 4 plots for each newspaper the residuals of Government Advertising and Frontpage 
after regressing both variables on newspaper and month dummies. Focusing on the 
residuals allows for an easier comparison of the data. The large month and 
newspaper fixed effects would otherwise overshadow the within variation in 
Frontpage and Government Advertising. It is noticeable from the data that government 
                                                           
13 For example, the data can withstand a formal auditing process. Founded in 1989, this NGO has focused on 
government transparency and became the Latin American Chapter for Transparency International when the latter 
was launched in the mid 1990’s. It has organized presidential debates on the topic (for example in 1999), has 
promoted legal actions against the government and has organized national campaigns to bring about change in 
specific areas. 11 
 
advertising within a newspaper changes even within a presidential period. For example, 
we observe that government spending on Clarín plummets during the middle of the 
Kirchner administration. Note that in developed countries it is natural to consider a 
presidential period as only one regime, thus a control for newspaper-president 
interactions would not leave variation of Government Advertising. In contrast, in our 
sample, a one standard deviation in Government Advertising within the 16 presidential-
newspaper units is 0.17, similar to the between standard deviation (the overall 
standard deviation is 0.26). Newspapers also change their relative reporting over time 
within a presidency (for example, Ámbito tends to report less corruption scandals in its 
front page than other newspapers during the middle of De la Rua government). 
To obtain a more detailed analysis of the interactions between each newspaper-
president pair we regress Front Pages and Government Advertising on month, newspaper 
and newspaper-president interactions dummies. Here the newspaper-De la Rua 
interactions are the excluded categories. Figures 5 and 6 show the 95% confidence 
intervals for the newspaper-president interactions fixed effects. Regarding the 
assignment of government advertising the Página 12-Kirchner and Clarín-Kirchner 
interactions stand out in comparison to La Nación-Kirchner and specially Ámbito-
Kirchner fixed effects (Figure 5). In relation to the reporting of corruption we 
observe significant changes in the behavior of the two smallest and most ideological 
newspapers (Figure 6). Since the contents of newspapers (large or small) affect the 
television and radio agenda, the government might be interested in silencing even the 
smallest and most ideologically distant newspaper. In comparison to the De la Rua 
period the Página 12-president interaction is larger (more reporting) during the 
Menem administration and smaller during the Duhalde and Kirchner governments. 
With respect to Ámbito we observe a larger interaction effect in the Duhalde and 
Kirchner presidencies.  
 
II.c. Empirical Strategy 
We start by estimating an OLS regression of the form  
Front Pagesmj = α Ln(Government Advertisingmj+1)+ j +m+ µmj 
where Front Pages is the total amount of front page space devoted to covering 
corruption scandals of the current administration in month m, in newspaper j; 
Government Advertising is the amount of money spent by the government on 
advertising in month m and in newspaper j; while θ is a newspaper dummy;  is a 12 
 
month dummy and μ is an error term. We study other specifications, including one 
which adds newspaper-president interactions dummies.
1415 
The second approach exploits information on the individual scandals. The first is 
similar to the specification above, but instead use Hide, Front Pages Incidents or Front 
Pages Affaires as the dependent variable. The second is an OLS regression of the form   
Front Pages Scandalsmj = α Ln(Government Advertisingsmj+1)+ j +m+s+ smj 
where Front Pages Scandal is the total amount of front page space devoted to covering 
corruption scandal s of the current administration in month m, in newspaper j; λ is a 
scandal fixed effect and ω is an error term. We also include other specifications, 
including one which adds to the above equation different dummies for each different 
newspaper under each president.  
Note that our measure of government influence is restricted to financial influence 
and leaves out an enormous array of other strategies that range from physical 
intimidation to access to information (which are discussed in section IIa).
16 Note 
further, that within financial influence, we focus on one narrow activity –namely 
government advertising- while section II.a. mentions several other forms of financial 
influence for which we have anecdotal evidence (at least), including ownership laws, 
which have in fact been used in Argentina involving the newspapers in our sample. 
We do not have a lot of information about the co-movements in these other 
measures of influence and government advertising. These alternative measures are 
unlikely to be perfectly correlated and/or there may be some substitution between 
alternative forms of influence (the standard errors may be too large and there may be 
a downward bias in the point estimate of α in the two equations above). 
Three theoretical predictions can be made with respect to α, the main parameter of 
interest. The benchmark is α=0, which occurs when the media is independent and 
unaffected by government advertising.  
One alternative is that α <0, with some variations within this regime. On the one 
hand, a negative correlation could be revealing a situation where the media is 
“motivated” by money and tilts reporting to favor the government in exchange for 
                                                           
14 On the need to include time effects as newspaper content has changed during the digital age, see, for 
example, Boczkowski and de Santos (2007). On matching in commercial advertising, see Anand and Shachar 
(2004). 
15 Similar results are obtained if we do not use a logarithm specification over Government Advertising. 
16 The strategies (and their effectiveness) differ by country. For example, differential access to information is 
frequently observed, in part because laws granting access have stalled during our sample period. For example in 
Argentina, a freedom of information bill supported by press groups died in Congress in 2005. Changes 
introduced by the Senate required those requesting information to explain their reasons, to file an application 
similar to an affidavit, and, in some cases, to pay a fee. See Committee to Protect Journalists (2006). 13 
 
government advertising. On the other hand, there is the possibility that α is 
identifying a different relationship as outlined by previous work in this literature: 
firms (or governments in our case) of a particular type may direct advertising towards 
particular media to reach particular readers without expecting a quid pro quo from the 
latter; and the media of particular type may appreciate, and hence give particular 
coverage to these firms (or governments) (see, for example, Reuter and Zitzewitz, 
2006 and, in particular, Anand and Shachar, 2004). Fortunately, our data set is 
sufficiently rich as to allow us to include government-newspaper interaction fixed 
effects that filters out the main source of potential bias: and ideological proximity 
fixed effect. One further possibility exists: the bias outlined above may operate at the 
level of particular news events. In that case, we have the possibility of including 
government-newspaper-scandal fixed effects. 
An alternative is α>0, which is strange from the point of view economic incentives: 




II.  Results 
III.a. Main Estimates 
In Table 1 we present our basic set of estimates, which are based on Front Pages, the 
total coverage of (any) corruption scandal, per month per newspaper. We present the 
simplest possible specification, including only our measure of government transfers 
as there aren’t many measurable and plausible confounding sources of variation. In 
subsequent specifications we add dummies that capture the level of ideological 
proximity between the president and each newspaper, as well as other specifications 
that study the robustness of the basic correlation. In all the regressions included in 
the paper we use Newey-West standard errors to allow for autocorrelation and 
heteroskedasticity.
18 
In column (1) we find that the coefficient on Government Advertising is negative and 
significant at the 1% level, indicating that coverage of corruption scandals within 
newspapers is lower when government spending on advertising is high (we also 
include a set of month dummies). Column (2) adds a set of newspaper times 
president interaction dummies (i.e., includes a set of 16 dummies, one for each 
newspaper-president pair). The coefficient on Government Advertising in column (2) is 
negative and significant at the 1%, suggesting that even within a certain newspaper 
and president regime, reporting of government corruption occupies less front page 
                                                           
17 Perhaps to avoid criticism of attempting to influence the media (although in such a scenario α=0 should be 
enough).  In Borges’ short story The Bribe, an academic obtains the favor of a senior colleague by being openly 
critical of his work (anticipating the latter’s desire to appear unbiased). 
18 Similar results are obtained if we use Prais-Winsten standard errors. 14 
 
space when government advertising is relatively generous. It is worth noting that the 
coefficient drops to half of its value after including the interaction dummies. This 
result suggests that the ideological proximity between government and newspaper is 
also a factor in explaining both the distribution of advertising and the reporting of 
corruption scandals. 
In order to get some sense of the size of the correlation, we note that a one standard 
deviation increase in government advertising (0.26 million pesos of 2000) is 
associated with a reduction in coverage of corruption scandals in the month by 0.31 
of a cover, or 25% of a standard deviation in Front Pages.
19 
Further tests suggest that these findings are robust. While the next subsection 
explores this in more depth, here we anticipate some simple results. In column (3) 
we add a time trend for each newspaper-president pair. The time trend consist of a 
linear function over the number of months the government has been in office, which 
is then interacted with the 16 newspaper-president dummies (similar results are 
obtained with a quadratic time trend). The coefficient of interest in column (3) is 
again negative and significant at the 10% level.  
For the 2000-2007 period it is possible to separate Government Advertising into 
advertising executed or not through the centralized agency, Télam. It is reasonable to 
assume that the agencies that manage their advertising autonomously will put more 
weight on their own marketing priorities and less weight on the national government 
political agenda.
20 In Table 2 we repeat the regressions performed in Table 1 
replacing Government Advertising by either the advertising channeled through Télam or 
by the resources placed by the exempted national agencies. The results suggest that 
only the government transfers managed by the centralized agency are correlated with 
the reporting of corruption. 
In Table 3 we repeated the regression included in column (2) in Table 1 excluding 
either one newspaper or one president at a time. The eight new regressions yielded a 
negative coefficient over Government Advertising. The coefficient is, however, 
statistically insignificant in the specification where the Kirchner presidency is 
excluded. Note that in this specification the number of observations is almost 
halved. We find that the main coefficient is largest in absolute terms when we 
exclude Clarín, the newspaper with largest circulation, followed by La Nación (the 
second largest circulation), then Página 12 (the third newspaper in terms of 
circulation in our sample; but see the discussion on sources for circulation numbers 
in Section IV) and then Ámbito. In other words, coverage of scandals in the 
                                                           
19 We evaluate the increase in Government Advertising at its mean value (0.23). 
20 This assumption is supported by the fact that, as its conflict with the media intensified, the national 
government decided in 2009 to eliminate these exceptions and force all federal organisms to channel the 
advertising through a centralized agency. 15 
 
newspapers with the largest circulation seems to be the least sensitive to government 
advertising. There are fewer differences in the main coefficient of interest when we 
exclude one president at a time. The coefficient is smallest in absolute terms when 
we exclude Kirchner. 
The first column in Table 4 explores the timing by including a lagged measure of 
Government Advertising. Both current and lagged Government Advertising enter with 
negative coefficients, while current levels seem to have a stronger connection to 
corruption coverage. It is also possible that the advertising-coverage connection 
takes place at a lower frequency. To provide a partial evaluation of this possibility in 
columns (2) through (6) we run the basic specification using longer lags. Although 
the large standard errors do not allow for more precise conclusions, the data do not 
suggest that our use of specifications in current levels in Table 1 is obviously 
wrong.
21  
Column (7) in Table 4 includes a measure of lagged coverage. It reveals that the 
autoregressive component is not particularly large (it is slightly smaller than a 
quarter). The main coefficient on Government Advertising is negative and significant at 
the 5%, suggesting that after controlling for previous coverage, current coverage is 
negatively correlated with current Government Advertising. 
Within the theories of “motivated” reporting (by which we mean reporting that is 
not independent of monetary transfers; see section II.c.), both corruption (whereby 
the government offers money to newspapers to reduce adverse coverage) and 
extortion (whereby a newspaper exaggerates unfavorable coverage until the 
government pays up) are possible. Note that, in both cases, the negative correlation 
we are uncovering means that the discretional regime for making government 
transfers to newspapers introduces distortions in reporting.
22 Nevertheless, the 
Granger analysis performed in Table 5 suggests that it is the government the one that 
leads and not the other way around. 
Finally, Table 6 investigates the correlation between government transfers and 
coverage of scandals by non-political actors. Our database contains coverage of 
scandals in which trade unions, the police, the church or a group of low income, 
often unemployed individuals were involved.
23 There are 321 scandals involving 
                                                           
21 It would be possible to disaggregate the advertising data at the daily level (the data from Poder Ciudadano is 
tabulated per advertisement, but it includes the month and not the date in which the advertisement was 
published). This would allow us to perform the regressions in Table 1 at the daily level. 
22 Note that in models with full information the estimated effect would be identical under either form of 
motivated reporting. In Reuter and Zitzewitz (2006) the results for one publication that does not have 
advertisements (Consumer Reports) can be used as a possible benchmark (although interestingly the sample of 
funds recommended by Consumer Reports also comes from firms that spend relatively more on advertising).  
23 This group known as “piqueteros” has become a mildly important social actor in Argentina (it is like a trade 
union of the unemployed). 16 
 
these groups, which are covered in the front page 941 times. The correlations 
reported in Table 6 are statistically insignificant, suggesting that not all coverage of 
scandals is negatively correlated with government transfers. 
 
III.b. Robustness: Measures of Coverage using Data on Individual Scandals 
We next explore the robustness of our findings exploiting the fact that we have 
information on individual scandals, which allows us to develop different measures of 
coverage of corruption.  
Table 7 separates front page coverage of corruption scandals that were reported by 
just one newspaper (which we call Front Pages Incidents) from coverage regarding 
scandals that were widely reported (by at least two newspapers, which we call Front 
Pages Affaires). The coefficient on Incidents is negative and significant at the 1% level in 
column 1 and at the 18% level in column 2. Meanwhile the coefficients on Affaires 
are both negative and significant at the 1% level. We know that by construction the 
coefficients on both Affaires and Incidents add up to the corresponding coefficient 
when Front Pages is used as the dependent variable. Using the coefficients in column 
2 in Table 1 and in columns 2 and 4 in Table 7, we observe that Affaires accounts for 
81% of the estimated correlation (0.81=1.33/1.64) and Incidents accounts for only 
19% (0.19=0.31/1.64). Therefore, we detect that most of the computed correlation 
is originated from the reporting of scandals extensively reported in the media. 
Table 8 reports results using Front Page Scandal, the number of front pages per month 
accounted by the space granted to coverage of a specific scandal by a newspaper. 
Columns (1-5) include newspaper and month fixed effects as well as a set of other 
president-newspaper-scandal fixed effects combinations. In all of the regressions the 
association with Government Advertising is negative and significant. Regressions (2-5) 
include a president-newspaper interaction. In columns 3 through 5 we add a time 
trend for each newspaper-president pair. Scandals fixed effects are included in 
columns 4 and 5. To see the size of the effect, note that the coefficient on regression 
(5), which also controls for newspaper-scandal interactions, is -0.017. This suggests 
that an increase in Government Advertising of one standard deviation is associated with 
a decrease in coverage of a particular scandal of 2.7% of a standard deviation in the 
Front Pages Scandal variable. 
Table 9 looks at a measure of the speed of reporting. Hide is a measure of the extent 
to which newspapers do not report news items that are negative to the government. 
Specifically, Hide counts the number of corruption scandals already reported by some 17 
 
other newspaper but not yet reported by this newspaper.
24 We do not find a robust 
and significant association between our measure of coverage (Hide) and Government 
Advertising. This result suggests that the correlation between government advertising 
and the reporting of corruption is not driven by the decision concerning when to 
first report a scandal but by the amount of space devoted to its treatment over time. 
In the next section we study the relation between reporting of corruption and 
newspaper readership as a possible explanation for this result.  
 
III.  Discussion 
An interesting and important question concerns the reputational costs for 
newspapers arising from biased coverage (see, for example, the discussion in 
Gentzkow and Shapiro, 2006). On the one hand, it is possible to retain models 
where bias is visible to readers who compare the contents of daily publications if one 
relaxes the assumption of full verifiability (see, for example, Besley and Prat, 2006). 
Alternatively, the costs of biasing coverage are low if different readers consume 
different newspapers (see, for example, Mullainathan and Shleifer, 2005). 
Unfortunately, we do not have sufficient data for a full investigation of this issue. We 
do, however, have some data on circulation for the two main newspapers (Clarín and 
La Nación). These two have a much wider circulation than the other two newspapers 
in our sample so, financially, the issue is particularly relevant for these two 
publications.
25 Table 10 presents the correlation between circulation and Front Pages 
or Hide. The results suggest that there is a positive and statistically significant 
relationship between circulation and corruption coverage. Using the coefficient in 
column (1) in Table 10, we note that one standard deviation increase in Front Pages is 
associated with 1.35 million extra papers sold in the month. Meanwhile, one standard 
deviation decrease in Hide is associated with a 2.57 million increase in circulation per 
month.
26 The higher cost in terms of readership associated with not ever having 
reported scandals could explain the distinct relation between Government Advertising 
and Front Pages versus Government Advertising and Hide documented in Table 1 and 9 
respectively. Newspapers may be prone to decrease the number of front pages and 
space devoted to a corruption scandal by the government, but due to a higher 
                                                           
24 We also experimented with other definitions of Hide and reached similar conclusions. For example, similar 
results obtain if we define the variable only for scandals that were reported by at least two papers. 
25 The average circulation in the first half of 2007 of Clarín and La Nación is 284,000 copies per day versus 
approximately 20,000 for Página  12; estimates from ADC/Justice Initiative (2008). Our source for Clarín and 
La Nación is the Instituto Verificador de Circulaciones. Self reported data on daily circulation by Página  12 is 97,000, 
whereas for Ámbito  is 85,000. 
26 Note that these amounts are relatively large since average monthly circulation for Clarín in our sample is 
13.54 millions, and for La Nación is 5.06 millions. 18 
 
readership loss they may be hesitant to delay the reporting of a scandal that has 
already appeared in others newspapers. 
Of course, the media should be extremely unhappy about a regime with the 
characteristics we describe, as it involves biasing coverage for financial gain. Indeed, 
we collected evidence of several instances of journalist complaints concerning the 
regime with discretional government transfers (dressed as advertising). As just one 
example, consider an editorial in Clarín entitled “Abuses with Public Advertising”. It 
complains that the practice of public advertising has been transformed into a means 
of providing carrots and sticks in exchange for favorable coverage, and that there are 
“no objective parameters governing the distribution of public advertising nor adequate controls over 
the way money budgeted for this use is actually spent”.
27  
We do not offer any further interpretation of our findings, except to note that 1) 
several authors have argued that profit motives of media companies’ compromise 
coverage; that 2) we have presented evidence consistent with such “motivated 
coverage” in the presence of government transfers;
28 and that 3) this has implications 
for work considering how media firms affect the formation of beliefs. For example, 
Bennet (1990) emphasizes the need by reporters to have access to government 
sources and Chomsky and Herman (1988) make the argument that for-profit media 
must cater to advertisers to stay in business. This is consistent with the results of 
Reuter and Zitzewitz (2006) concerning biased investment recommendations.
29 The 
evidence presented in this paper concerns size and timing of coverage, which is a-
priori less serious from the point of view of an individual’s financial standing, but 
                                                           
27 See, “Abusos con la Publicidad Oficial”, Editorial, Clarín, 22 de Julio, 2009. See also, “La Publicidad Oficial 
como Censura”, La Nación, 14 de Abril, 2007. Of course such rhetorical evidence should be interpreted with 
caution. While several policy proposals have been made to reform the system, we note that the problems 
outlined in the paper can be avoided and the stated objectives of the program (“to provide information of the 
acts of government”) can still be achieved by removing discretion in the allocation of funds. For example, by 
fixing the amount going to each media outlet, or by allowing funding to depend on some predetermined 
formula (for example, based on historical data on circulation). 
28 While we have not produced a full-fledged theory of what is driving changes in government advertising, we 
point out that the inclusion of government-newspaper interactions solves the main problem of identification in 
the literature whereby government ideology drives favorable coverage and newspaper ideology drives funds and 
there is no quid-pro-quo (even implicitly). To test this hypothesis we construct a variable that interacts the 
government’s revenue level and a government-newspaper ideological proximity variable. The ideological 
proximity variable is created by using the space in each newspaper devoted to human rights abuses and the left-
right self-placement by the government voters in the Latinobarometro Survey. As expected the interaction variable 
has a positive and significant correlation with the advertising managed by Télam. Moreover, the correlation 
disappears once we focus, instead, on the advertising not channeled through the centralized agency. Finally, 
using the government’s fiscal position times ideological proximity as an instrument for Government Advertising 
suggests that a casual interpretation of the main results of the paper is appropriate. For example, the coefficient 
in column 1 in table 1 is -6.081 (standard error=1.271). 
29 Given their focus on financial returns they can derive a cost to readers from following the biased 
recommendations of the publications under study. They note that future returns are similar for mentioned and 
not mentioned funds, and conclude that the cost of bias to readers is small. In our case there is a financial cost 
of bias to the newspaper in terms of circulation, and to the reader in terms of information.  19 
 
which may affect the reader’s political positions, at the very least because it 
influences the salience of particular pieces of news and the extent of priming on 
these negative (from the government perspective) pieces of news. In the Argentine 
context, Di Tella, Galiani and Schargrodsky (2008) study how priming, of the type 
that appear in the newspaper coverage studied in this paper, influence political 
beliefs.
30 Specifically, they note that groups treated with a news report (i.e., that are 
read a newspaper report with negative comments on the water privatization that are 
made by the president which are demonstrably untrue) change their beliefs about the 
privatization of the water services in the direction reported by the newspaper. Of 
course, hard measures of coverage (such as size and timing) might also be correlated 
with other dimensions of coverage, such as framing, which might have a more 
sizeable influence on beliefs (see, for example, Entman, 1989). Indeed, if framing 
and editorial content also prove to be sensitive to public funding, media bias might 
help explain broader changes in beliefs. For example, economists who are puzzled by 
the popular backlash against market reforms might note that these took place during 
a period when the government both, moved to the left, and increased considerably 
spending on advertisement in the media. Finally, note also that we can detect 
reduced coverage but not if coverage is eliminated. 
 
IV.  Conclusions 
The media is potentially important in exercising control over abusive government, 
particularly in countries with high levels of corruption and weak legal systems. 
Accordingly, governments often try to influence the media through actions that 
range from outright censorship and intimidation, to favors and transfers. In this 
paper we provide a description of one aspect of the connection between the media 
and the government in Argentina 1998-2007, namely that concerned with monetary 
transfers to newspapers and their coverage of negative news events. 
We focus on coverage of government corruption scandals in the front page of the 
main four newspapers in the country. Advantages of focusing on corruption include 
that news events can be clearly classified as favorable or unfavorable to the 
government (independently of its political color), and that it is a topic that appears 
with relative frequency in the front page, with substantial variation in the amount of 
space devoted to it, both over time and across newspapers. Thus, the proportion of 
the front page occupied by the report on the current government’s corruption gives 
                                                           
30 The news report used in that study was originally published in Clarín in 2005, which is covered in our sample. 
The importance of beliefs in the determination of economic systems has been emphasized by several authors 
(see, for example, Piketty, 1995, Benabou and Tirole, 2006, Alesina and Angeletos, 2005, inter alia). There is also 
growing evidence on the variability of beliefs across groups and over time (see, for example, Alesina, Glaeser 
and Sacerdote, 2001, Di Tella, Galiani and Schargrodsky, 2007, Giuliano and Spilimbergo, 2009, inter alia). 20 
 
one measure of the intensity of negative coverage (per day per newspaper). This can 
be aggregated at the monthly level to give a measure of how intensely a particular 
newspaper has provided negative data on the government. We also have monthly 
data on government transfers in payment for public advertising to each newspaper, 
so we can estimate the correlation between transfers of money and front page space 
devoted to coverage of corruption scandals. The main estimate is negative and 
significant, even after controlling for newspaper and month fixed effects, as well as a 
set of other specifications. For example, the negative correlation survives the 
inclusion of a president-newspaper interaction dummies, suggesting that even within 
a certain newspaper and within a certain presidential period, front page coverage of 
news events that are unfavorable to the government is smaller when transfers are 
relatively high. The fact that the main coefficient is halved when we include the 
interactions fixed effects suggests that the ideological proximity between government 
and newspaper is also important to both the distribution of advertising and the 
reporting of corruption scandals. Nevertheless, the size continues to be considerable: 
a one standard deviation increase in monthly government advertising (0.26 million 
pesos of 2000) is correlated with a reduction in the coverage given to government 
corruption scandals in the month by 0.31 of a cover, or 25% of a standard deviation 
in our measure of front page coverage. 
We also construct several measures of coverage that exploit information at the 
scandal level, something that allows us to present a broader picture of how the 
government’s discretional advertising regime biases coverage. These measures 
include Incidents (coverage of scandals that were reported by just one newspaper), 
Affaires (coverage of scandals that were reported by at least two newspapers) and 
Hide (which counts the number of scandals already reported by some other 
newspaper but not yet reported by this newspaper). We provide a measure of the 
extent to which biased coverage is costly to newspapers in terms of reduced 
circulation for about half our sample. Finally, we find that only the government 
transfers that are channeled through a centralized agency are associated with a 
reduction in the reporting of corruption and also that the coverage of scandals by 
non-political actors is not correlated with government advertising. 
Overall, our findings are consistent with a model where newspapers bias reporting in 
favor of the government in exchange for transfers without prohibitively large 
financial costs arising from reduced circulation.21 
 
 
Figure 1: Front Page Clarín 8th October, 1998. The construction of Front Pages involves adding for a 
particular newspaper and for a particular month the fraction of each front page in the month devoted 
to covering corruption scandals of the current administration. Here, we considered Area(A+B)/Total 
Area as the contribution of october 8th to the measurement of Front Pages for Clarín in October 1998. 
Similarly, the Area(B)/Total Area is the October 8th contribution to the measurement of Front Pages 
Scandal  for  Clarín,  October  and  the  bribery  scandal  of  IBM-Banco  Nación;  similarly  the 
Area(A)/Total Area is the October 8th contribution to the measurement of Front Pages Scandal for 
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Figure 3: Government Advertising and Frontpage aggregated values for the four newspapers. 
 
 




   
   
 
Figure 4: Residuals of Government Advertising and Frontpage after regressing both variables on 











Figure 5: Newspaper-president interactions fixed effects -95% confidence intervals- obtained from 
an  OLS  regression  of  Government  Advertising  on  newspaper,  month  and  newspaper-president 
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Figure 6: Newspaper-president interactions fixed effects -95% confidence intervals- obtained from 
an OLS regression of Frontpage on newspaper, month and newspaper-president interactions dummies. 
The excluded categories are the interactions for the De la Rua presidency. 
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Table A: Top 20 Corruption Scandals according to Front Page Space 
Alleged Offender  Alleged Offense  Date first 
reported 
Number of front pages 
in the 4 Newspapers 
Day  Month  Govt. 
SIDE (De la Rua)  Bribery  23-Aug-00  2.9  17.0  43.9 
President and Cabinet (Kirchner)  Falsification of documents  6-Feb-04  0.1  0.1  15.2 
President and Cabinet (Kirchner)  Bribery  15-Mar-07  0.2  0.3  12.4 
President and Cabinet (Menem)  Illicit enrichment  19-Nov-98  0.3  1.3  7.5 
President and Cabinet (Kirchner)  Money laundering  26-Jun-07  0.1  0.1  7.3 
President and Cabinet (Menem)  Violent Crime  15-May-98  0.1  6.8  7.0 
President and Cabinet (De la Rua)  Concealment  12-Feb-01  0.3  5.6  6.8 
President and Cabinet (Menem)  Arms Trafficking  30-May-98  0.2  1.2  6.8 
President and Cabinet (De la Rua)  Bribery  19-Aug-00  0.1  0.1  6.5 
President and Cabinet (Kirchner)  Poor performance  5-Jan-04  0.4  0.4  6.0 
President and Cabinet (Kirchner)  Money laundering  9-Aug-07  0.9  5.2  5.3 
President and Cabinet (Menem)  Misappropriation of public funds  19-Apr-98  0.1  4.4  5.1 
PAMI (Menem)  Poor performance  10-May-98  0.2  0.2  3.5 
SIDE (Kirchner)  Poor performance  24-Jul-04  1.3  3.4  3.4 
President and Cabinet (De la Rua)  Theft  8-Mar-00  0.8  0.8  3.2 
President and Cabinet (Menem)  Misappropriation of public funds  16-May-99  0.1  3.2  3.2 
President and Cabinet (Menem)  Poor performance  20-Feb-99  0.8  3.1  3.2 
President and Cabinet (Kirchner)  Violent Crime  18-Aug-07  0.1  2.9  3.0 
President and Cabinet (Menem)  Racketeering  20-May-98  0.2  0.5  2.8 
President and Cabinet (Menem)  Racketeering  3-Jun-99  0.8  2.5  2.7 
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Table B: Top 20 Government Advertising Campaigns according to Total Spending  
(Period 2000-2007) 




Ministry of Economy  Bid  Bond exchange  Jan-05  0.69  21 
National Bank  Achievements  Institutional  Dec-04  0.50  27 
Minister of Federal Planning and 
Public Utilities 
Achievements  Public works  Sep-04  0.40  11 
Ministry of Economy  Announcement  Central wholesale fruit and 
vegetable market 
Feb-07  0.40  10 
Ministry of Economy  Announcement  Central wholesale fruit and 
vegetable market 
Mar-07  0.40  12 
Ministry of Economy  Announcement  Central wholesale fruit and 
vegetable market 
Apr-07  0.40  12 
Ministry of Economy  Announcement  Fruit and vegetables  Jan-07  0.32  13 
Presidency  Achievements  First year in office  May-04  0.31  13 
Minister of Labor, Employment 
and Social Security 
Achievements  Reduction in under the counter 
jobs 
Mar-07  0.31  12 
Minister of Federal Planning and 
Public Utilities 
Achievements  Road construction  May-05  0.30  5 
Minister of the Provinces  Announcement  Safety  Apr-04  0.29  8 
Presidency  Achievements  First thirty days in office  Jun-03  0.28  4 
Minister of Federal Planning and 
Public Utilities 
Achievements  House construction  Sep-04  0.27  7 
Minister of Education  Achievements  Law of Education  Sep-05  0.26  9 
Secretary of Culture  Announcement  Congress of Spanish  Nov-
04 
0.26  20 
Social Security Institute  Bid  Medical services  Feb-00  0.25  7 
Agency for the Control of 
Highways Concessions 
Bid  Highway  Jul-06  0.25  8 
Federal Administration of Public 
Income 
Announcement  Tax education  Mar-04  0.24  1 
Presidency  Political Statement  Protests organized by farm 
unions 
Dec-06  0.23  10 
Secretary of Culture  Announcement  Credits  Apr-00  0.23  7 
Note: Total spending is in millions of pesos of the year 2000. 29 
 
 TABLE C: 
Average of the Fraction of Government Advertising assigned to each Newspaper over the 
different Advertising Campaigns  
(Period 2000-2007) 
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Note: Standard errors in parenthesis * denotes significant at the 10% level, ** 
denotes significant at the 5% level and *** denotes significant at the 1% level. 
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Table D: Summary Statistics 
Variable  Units  No. of Obs.  Mean  Std dev  Min.  Max. 
Front Pages  Fraction  Total= 468  0.60  1.25  0  7.91 
- between    n=4    0.35  0.37  1.13 
       - within    t=117    1.21  -0.53  7.65 
Government Advertising  Millions of   Total= 466  0.23  0.26  0  1.37 
- between  Pesos of 2000  n=4    0.10  0.09  0.33 
- within    t=117    0.25  -0.09  1.27 
Front Pages Scandal  Fraction  Total=18,064  0.01  0.16  0  7.6 
- between    n=1,016    0.08  0  1.01 
       - within    t=17.77    0.15  -0.46  7.34 
Hide  Counts  Total= 468  23.59  18.49  0  104 
- between    n=4    3.55  18.44  26.50 
       - within    t=117    18.23  -2.90  101.09 
Front Pages (1 paper)  Fraction  Total= 468  0.14  0.41  0  3.73 
- between    n=4    0.13  0.03  0.33 
       - within    t=117    0.39  -0.18  3.54 
Front Pages (2 at least)  Fraction  Total= 468  0.45  1.07  0  7.65 
- between    n=4    0.23  0.28  0.80 
       - within    t=117    1.05  -0.34  7.48 
Front Pages Other  Fraction  Total= 468  0.48  0.76  0  7.41 
- between    n=4    0.44  0.17  1.13 
       - within    t=117    0.65  -0.64  6.76 
Circulation  Millions  Total= 234  9.30  4.49  4.28  18.11 
- between    n=2    6  5.06  13.54 
       - within    t=117    1.45  6.62  13.87 
             
                            Note: All variable definitions are contained in the appendix. 




Total Coverage of Corruption Scandals and Government Advertising 
  (1)  (2)  (3) 






       
Fixed Effects       
Newspaper  YES  YES  YES 
Month  YES  YES  YES 
Newspaper x president  NO  YES  YES 
Newspaper x president x time trend  NO  NO  YES 
Adjusted R2  0.45  0.60  0.62 
N of Observations  466  466  466 
   Max Number of Months  117  117  117 
   Max Number of Newspapers  4  4  4 
Note:  Each column is a separate OLS regression (Newey-West standard errors 
in parenthesis). * denotes significant at the 10% level and *** denotes significant 
at the 1% level. The dependent variable is Front Pages, the number of front pages 
devoted to corruption in each newspaper in a month. Government Advertising is the 
amount of money spent on advertising by the government in each newspaper 
each month, in millions of 2000 pesos. 
 




Total Coverage of Corruption Scandals and Government Advertising 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6) 
  Télam  Télam  Télam  Autonomous  Autonomous  Autonomous 












             
Fixed Effects             
Newspaper  YES  YES  YES  YES  YES  YES 
Month  YES  YES  YES  YES  YES  YES 
Newspaper x president  NO  YES  YES  NO  YES  YES 
Newspaper x president x time trend  NO  NO  YES  NO  NO  YES 
Adjusted R2  0.51  0.54  0.55  0.46  0.52  0.54 
N of Observations  384  384  384  384  384  384 
   Max Number of Months  96  96  96  96  96  96 
   Max Number of Newspapers  4  4  4  4  4  4 
Note:  Each column is a separate OLS regression (Newey-West standard errors 
in parenthesis). * denotes significant at the 10% level and *** denotes significant 
at the 1% level. The dependent variable is Front Pages, the number of front pages 
devoted to corruption in each newspaper in a month. Government Advertising is the 
amount of money spent on advertising by the government in each newspaper 
each month, in millions of 2000 pesos. 33 
 
TABLE 3: 
Total Coverage of Corruption Scandals and Government Advertising 
  Newspaper excluded  President excluded 
  Ámbito   Clarín  La Nación  Página  12  Menem  De la Rúa  Duhalde  Kirchner 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7)  (8) 
















                 
Adjusted R2  0.76  0.54  0.56  0.49  0.54  0.62  0.60  0.63 
N of Observations  350  349  350  349  384  370  398  246 
   Max N Months  117  117  117  117  96  93  100  62 
   Max N Newspapers  3  3  3  3  4  4  4  4 
Note: Each column is a separate OLS regression (Newey-West standard errors 
in parenthesis). *** denotes significant at the 1% level. The dependent variable is 
Front Pages, the number of front pages devoted to corruption in each newspaper 
in a month. Government Advertising is the amount of money spent on advertising 
by the government in each newspaper each month, in millions of 2000 pesos. All 
regressions  include  newspaper,  month  and  newspaper-president  interactions 
fixed effects. 34 
 
TABLE 4: 
Timing: Lagged Government Advertising and Lagged Coverage of Corruption  
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7) 
Front Pages (t-1)              0.236** 
(0.100) 














Ln(Government Advertising(t-1)+1)  -0.336 
(0.759)           
 
Ln(Government Advertising(t-1-t-2)+1)    0.442 
(0.611)         
 
Ln(Government Advertising(t-1-t-3)+1)      0.201 
(0.535)       
 
Ln(Government Advertising(t-1-t-4)+1)        0.103 
(0.476)     
 
Ln(Government Advertising(t-1-t-5)+1)          0.054 
(0.443)   
 
Ln(Government Advertising(t-1-t-6)+1)            0.023 
(0.420) 
 
               
Adjusted R2  0.60  0.59  0.58  0.58  0.58  0.58  0.62 
N of Observations  460  454  448  442  436  430  462 
   Max N of Months  116  115  114  113  112  111  117 
   Max N of Newspapers  4  4  4  4  4  4  4 
Note: Each column is a separate OLS regression (Newey-West standard errors 
in parenthesis). * denotes significant at the 10% level and ** denotes significant 
at the 5% level. The dependent variable is Front Pages, the number of front pages 
devoted to corruption in each newspaper in a month. Government Advertising is the 
amount of money spent on advertising by the government in each newspaper 
each month, in millions of 2000 pesos. Government Advertising (t-1-t-i) takes the 
value of Government Advertising in the previous i months. Front Pages (t-1) takes the 
value of Front Pages in the previous month. All regressions include newspaper, 
month and newspaper-president interactions fixed effects. 35 
 
TABLE 5:  
Granger Analysis of Coverage of Corruption and Government Advertising 
  Dependent Variables 
  Front Pages  Government Advertising 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6) 












Front Pages (t-2)    0.049 
(0.077) 
0.061 




Front Pages (t-3)      -0.044 
(0.074)      -0.000 
(0.003) 
F value for Front Pages lags  5.50**  3.35**  2.20*  0.96  0.26  0.08 












Ln(Government Advertising+1) (t-2)    0.631 
(0.908) 
1.445 




Ln(Government Advertising+1) (t-3)      -1.307 
(1.000)      0.058 
(0.076) 
F value for Advertising lags  3.48*  1.85  2.73**  52.72***  28.99***  19.96*** 
             
N of Observations  460  456  450  460  454  448 
   Max N of Months  116  115  114  116  115  114 
   Max N of Newspapers  4  4  4  4  4  4 
Note: Each column is a separate OLS regression (Newey-West standard errors 
in parenthesis). * denotes significant at the 10% level, ** denotes significant at 
the 5% level and *** denotes significant at the 1% level. The dependent variable 
is  Front  Pages,  the  number  of  front  pages  devoted  to  corruption  in  each 
newspaper in a month. Government Advertising is the amount of money spent on 
advertising by the government in each newspaper each month, in millions of 
2000 pesos. All regressions include newspaper, month and newspaper-president 
interactions fixed effects. 
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TABLE 6: 
Total Coverage of Corruption by the Police, the Church and Unions and Government 
Advertising 
  (1)  (2) 




     
Fixed Effects     
Newspaper  YES  YES 
Month  YES  YES 
Newspaper x president  NO  YES 
Adjusted R2  0.46  0.48 
N of Observations  466  466 
   Maximum N of Months  117  117 
   Maximum N of Newspapers  4  4 
Note: Each column is a separate OLS regression (Newey-West standard errors 
in parenthesis). The dependent variable is Front Pages Other, the number of front 
pages devoted to scandals by members of the Police, Trade Unions and the 
Church in each newspaper in a month. Government Advertising is the amount of 
money spent on advertising by the government in each newspaper each month, 
in millions of 2000 pesos. 
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TABLE 7: 
Coverage of Corruption (Incidents and Affaires) and Government Advertising 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 
  Incidents  Incidents  Affaires  Affaires 








         
Fixed Effects         
Newspaper  YES  YES  YES  YES 
Month  YES  YES  YES  YES 
Newspaper x president  NO  YES  NO  YES 
Adjusted R2  0.09  0.33  0.53  0.60 
N of Observations  466  466  466  466 
   Max N of Months  117  117  117  117 
   Max N of Newspapers  4  4  4  4 
Note: Each column is a separate OLS regression (Newey-West standard errors 
in parenthesis). *** denotes significant at the 1% level. In columns (1) and (2), 
the  sample  is  restricted  dependent  variable  is  Front  Pages  Incidents,  the  total 
number of front pages devoted to any corruption scandal that was reported by 
only one newspaper, in each newspaper in a month. In columns (3) and (4), the 
dependent variable is Front Pages Affaires, the total number of front pages devoted 
to any corruption scandal that was reported by at least two newspapers, in each 
newspaper in a month. Government Advertising is the amount of money spent on 
advertising by the government in each newspaper each month, in millions of 
2000 pesos. 38 
 
TABLE 8: 
Coverage of Individual Corruption Scandals and Government Advertising 
 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5) 










           
Fixed Effects           
Newspaper  YES  YES  YES  YES  YES 
Month  YES  YES  YES  YES  YES 
Newspaper x president  NO  YES  YES  YES  YES 
Newspaper x president x time trend  NO  NO  YES  YES  YES 
Scandal  NO  NO  NO  YES  YES 
Scandal x newspaper  NO  NO  NO  NO  YES 
Adjusted R2  0.02  0.02  0.03  0.10  0.12 
N of Observations  17,920  17,920  17,920  17,920  17,920 
   Max N of Scandals  254  254  254  254  254 
   Max N of Months  117  117  117  117  117 
   Max N of Newspapers  4  4  4  4  4 
Note: Each column is a separate OLS regression (Newey-West standard errors 
in parenthesis). * denotes significant at the 10% level, ** denotes significant at 
the 5% level and *** denotes significant at the 1% level. The dependent variable 
is  Front  Pages  Scandal,  the  number  of  front  pages  devoted  to  a  particular 
corruption scandal in each newspaper per month. Government Advertising is the 
amount of money spent on advertising by the government in each newspaper 
each month, in millions of 2000 pesos. 
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TABLE 9: 










     
Fixed Effects     
Newspaper  YES  YES 
Month  YES  YES 
Newspaper x president  NO  YES 
Adjusted R2  0.80  0.93 
N of Observations  466  466 
   Max N of Months  117  117 
   Max N of Newspapers  4  4 
Note: Each column is a separate OLS regression (Newey-West standard errors 
in parenthesis). *** denotes significant at the 1% level. The dependent variable is 
Hide, the number of “hides” (defined as a corruption scandal that has already 
broken  but  is  not  yet  reported  by  the  newspaper)  per  month.  Government 
Advertising is the amount of money spent on advertising by the government in 
each newspaper each month, in millions of 2000 pesos. 40 
 
TABLE 10: 
Newspaper Circulation and Coverage of Corruption 
  (1)  (2) 
Front Pages  1.087*** 
(0.379)   
Hide    -0.139*** 
(0.017) 
     
Fixed Effects     
Newspaper  YES  YES 
Month  YES  YES 
Adjusted R2  0.92  0.94 
N of Observations  234  234 
   Maximum N of Months  117  117 
   Maximum N of Newspapers  2  2 
Note: Each column is a separate OLS regression (Newey-West standard errors 
in parenthesis). *** denotes significant at the 1% level. The dependent variable is 
Newspaper Circulation, the number of editions sold by each newspaper in a month, 
in millions. Front Pages is the number of front pages devoted to corruption in 
each  newspaper  in  a  month.  Hide  is  the  number  of  “hides”  (defined  as  a 
corruption  scandal  that  has  already  broken  but  is  not  yet  reported  by  the 
newspaper) per month. 
 41 
 
Description of the Variables 
Front Pages: The total amount of space in the front pages, in a particular newspaper and in a 
particular month, devoted to covering corruption scandals of the current 
administration. The unit is the number of front pages (0 to 30). Source: Authors’ 
calculation. 
Government Advertising: Total spending per month on advertising in each newspaper by the 
government, in millions of pesos of the year 2000. Source: Fundación Poder Ciudadano. 
Front Pages Other: The total amount of space in the front pages, in a particular newspaper and 
in a particular month, devoted to covering scandals by trade unions, the police, the 
church and the “piqueteros” (group of low-income and unemployed workers). The 
unit is the number of front pages (0 to 30). Source: Authors’ calculation. 
Front Pages Scandal: The total amount of space in the front pages, in a particular newspaper 
and in a particular month, devoted to covering a particular corruption scandal of the 
current administration. The unit is the number of front pages (0 to 30). Source: 
Authors’ calculation. 
Front Pages Incidents: The total amount of space in the front pages, in a particular newspaper 
and in a particular month, devoted to covering corruption scandals of the current 
administration that were reported by only one newspaper. The unit is the number of 
front pages (0 to 30). Source: Authors’ calculation. 
Front Pages Affaires: The total amount of space in the front pages, in a particular newspaper 
and in a particular month, devoted to covering corruption scandals of the current 
administration that were reported by two or more newspapers. The unit is the 
number of front pages (0 to 30). Source: Authors’ calculation. 
Hide: The total number of corruption scandals of the current administration already reported 
by at least one newspaper that have not yet been reported by each newspaper per 
month. Source: Authors’ calculation. 
Circulation: Number of editions per month sold by newspaper, in millions. Source: Instituto 
Verificador de Circulaciones. 42 
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